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VIRGIL V. VOELTZ, Respondent, v. BAKERY AND CONFECTIONERY WORKERS INTERNATIONAL
UNION OF AMERICA, LOCAI1 UNION NUMBER 37
et al., Appellants.
[1] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Unions Excluded.-Only a

company union which is "financed in whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled by the employer" is
excluded from consideration under the Jurisdictional Strike
Act. (Lab. Code, §§ 1117, 1118.)
[2] Id.-Evidence.-An implied finding that an association organized to represent plaintiff's employees was not company
dominated is sustained by affidavits, filed on application for a
preliminary injunction in action to enjoin defendant labor
unions from picketing plaintiff's bakery business, that idea of
an employee union had been discussed between at least some
of' thP employees a year previously, and that a union of nonsupervisory employees was formed after a person who was
experienced in labor organization problems and who was in no
way connected with plaintiff was consulted and met with them
at the time of organization on their invitation.
[3] Injunctions-Preliminary Injunction-Affidavits.-Trial court
is judge of credibility of affidavits filed on application for a
preliminary injunction, and it is within its province to resolve all conflicts.
[ 4] Labor-Jurisdictional Strike Act-Construction of Statute.Mere fact that a dispute existed between defendant labor
unions and plaintiff employer prior to time that an association to represent his employees was formed does not take
case out of Jurisdictional Strike Act, requiring that the interference with employer's business arise out of a controversy
between unions, where after such association was formed and
plaintiff's employees became members thereof, it endeavored
to have defendants cease picketing and to induce plaintiff
to bargain with it exclusively, yet defendants continued their
concerted activities, interfering with plaintiff's business.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County granting a preliminary injunction and denying motion to vacate such injunction. W. Turney Fox, Judge.
Affirmed.
[4] See 5 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1945 Rev.), Labor,§ 31 et seq.;
Am.Jur., Labor, § 178 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1,4] Labor, §21; [2] Labor, §28;
[3] Injunctions, §53.
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Gilbert, Nissen & Irvin, Robert W. Gilbert and Clarence
K Todd for Appellants.
Charles 1'. Scully and 'l'obriner & Lazarus as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Appellants.
Hyman Smith and Howard R. Harris for Respondent.

Hotll & Baln·s as Amici Curiae on behalf of Hespondent.
SHENK, J .-This is au appeal from an order granting a
preliminary injunction and an order denying a motion to
vacate that order.
According to the complaint and affidavits viewed most
favorably to plaintiff, it appears that plaintiff is eng·aged in
the b nsiness of making and distributing bakery products to
the wholesale trade, under the name Golden Krust Bakery.
Defendants are labor unions and members thereof, the main
ones being Bakery and Confectionery Workers' International
Union of America, Local Union No. 37 and Bakery Drivers
Local Union No. 276. In 1948, plaintiff employed 49 persons,
consisting of 45 production workers, two truck drivers and
two miscellaneous. Plaintiff sells his products to independent
''route dealers'' who in turn sell to consumers, and to retail
dealers in bakery products, delivery to the latter being made
by plaintiff's trucks and the product being picked up by the
former at plaintiff's place of business. In the latter part
of 1948, defendants' Locals 37 and 276, commenced a campaign to organize plaintiff's employees and to induce them
to join their unions and demanded that plaintiff sign a
contract with them making them exclusive bargaining agents
for his employees. Plaintiff refused, because a ''substantial
number" of his employees advised him that they would refuse
to join the unions, and if he signed such a contract, they
would quit. In August, 1948, it was claimed that plaintiff
discharged one of his employees because of union membership
and the unions filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board that such act was an unfair labor practice. I.1ater
in November, 1948, the employee was reinstated under a
settlement in that proceeding and plaintiff was required to
post notices that he would discontinue such practice. Defendants assert that the employee was again discharged.
In September, 1948, Local 37 filed a petition with the National
I1abor Relations Board for certification as collective bargain-
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ing representative for plaintiff's employees. The board held
<1 hearing and dismissed the petition on November 23, 194:-i.
On D<>eemher 7, 1948, the nnions representing 10 of plaintiff's employees threatened to and did place pickets around
plaintiff's plant, and continued to picket said plant until
January 19, 1950, when this action was commenced; said
n nions also called a strike of plaintiff's employees to which
10 responded and ceased work for a week. The unions advised plaintiff on occasions between December, 1948, awl
November, 1949, that unless he signed contracts with them
they would destroy his business, although they knew plaintiff's
employees were against it. The unions placed plaintiff on the
"blacklist" as unfair to organized labor. The pickets carried
signs stating that plaintiff was unfair to organized labor.
Some of the pickets followed the independent route dealers to
their customers and displayed their signs. The unions contaeted plaintiff's retail customers and threatened to picket
thrm unless they ceased to buy plaintiff's products; some of
plaintiff's customers were picketed by defendants. As a result
of defendant unions' activities, plaintiff's customers refused
to buy from him, to the grave injury of plaintiff's business.
On November 19, 1949, all but two of plaintiff's then 39
employees (the others later consented) met and formed a labor
organization, called Golden Krust Independent Employees
Association, to represent them. It is not controlled or dominated by plaintiff. On November 21, 1949, the association
petitioned the National I_~abor Relations Board for certification
as exclusive· bargaining agent. It was certified as a labor
organization but the petition to be exclusive bargainer was
dismissed on the ground that interstate commerce was not
affected. Discussions were had between the association and
the unions in the latter part of December, 1949, and January,
1950, the former requesting the latter to cease their concerted
activities. On December 10, 1949, the association requested of
the unions that a secret ballot election be held among plaintiff's employees to determine the bargaining representative.
'l'his request was denied. The association informed plaintiff
that if he signed a contract with the unions it would call a strike.
'l'he trial court, in the preliminary injunction, enjoined
defendants from picketing plaintiff's plant, representing
that his employees are unorganized, and his products are
made by unorganized labor.
There is no indication that the dispute affected interstate
eommerce, hence the I,abor Management Relations Act of
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1947 (29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.) is not involved. Defendants
belatedly make the contention that the National Labor Relations Board said in one of its orders of dismissal above referred to that it did not agree with plaintiff that he was not
engaged in interstate commerce, but it does not appear that
such order was called to the attention of the trial court either
before its order for the preliminary injunction or on the
motion to vacate it. There is no allegation in the complaint or
statement in any affidavit or defendants' answer that plaintiff
is engaged in interstate commerce. The validity of the J urisdic.tional Strike Law of California (Lab. Code, § 1115 et seq.) is
questioned, but that point was settled in Seven Up Bottling Co.
v. Grocery Drivers Union, ante, p. 368 [254 P.2d 544].
Plaintiff rests his support for the injunction and the court
granted it on the basis of the Jurisdictional Strike Law. The
main contention of defendants, aside from the claimed invalidity of the Jurisdictional Strike Law, is that there was no
violation of that law, because their picketing and concerted
activity did not arise out of a dispute between two labor
organizations, they and the association, because the dispute
between them and plaintiff had been in existence some 11
months before the association was organized. Involved herein is the interpretation and application of sections 1117 and
1118 of the Labor Code, reading: ''As used herein, 'labor
organization' means any organization or any agency or employee representation committee or any local unit thereof in
which employees participate, and exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours of employment or
conditions of work, which labor organization is not found to be
financed in whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or
controlled by the employer." (§ 1117.) "As used in this
chapter, 'jurisdictional strike' means a concerted refusal to
perform work for an employer or any other concerted interference with an employer's operation or business, arising out
of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as
to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to
bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of his employees or any of them, or arising out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which of them
has or should have the exclusive right to have its members
perform work for an employer." ( § 1118.)
40 C.2d-13
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[1] Jt shonld first be observed that the defendants speak
of the assoeiation as a "company" union, suggesting that as
such it is e~cluded from consideration under the Jurisdictional
Strike I,aw. But it is only a company union "financed in
whole or in part, interfered with, dominated or controlled
by the employer" that is excluded. (Lab. Code, §§ 1117,
1118, supra.) [2] While the evidence is conflicting, plaintiff's
verified complaint and affidavits offered by him show the
association not to be such an organization. Defendants claim
that the one who organized the association was the brother of
one of plaintiff's foremen, that some of plaintiff's supervisory
employees attended a meeting of the association, and that
such organizations must be carefully scrutinized, citing McKay v. Retail A1do Salesmen's Local Union, 16 Cal.2d 311
1106 P.2d 373]. Nevertheless, the court granted the injunction,
thereby impliedly finding that the association was not company
dominated, and :,;tated in its memorandum opinion: "As to defendant's second contention, it cannot be said, at this stage
of the proceed1:ngs, that the employee organization is not a
bona fide union and that it is not free from company domination and control. It appears from the affidavits that the idea
of an employee union has been discussed between at least some
of the employees as early as April of last year, and that in
November a person who was experienced in labor organization
problems and who was in no way connected with plaintiff was
consulted by the employees and invited to meet with them.
Such a meeting was held on November 19th and the union of
non-supervisory employees was formed and officers elected."
[3] The trial court was the judge of the credibility of the
affidavits and it was its province to resolve all conflicts.
(Northwestern Pac. R. Co. v. Lumber&: S.W. Union, 31 Cal.
2d 441, 443 [189 P.2d 277] .) The complaint alleged that there
was no domination or control by plaintiff over the association
and the affidavits submitted by him are to the same effect.
In their argument that their concerted interference did not
arise out of a controversy between them and another labor
organization (Lab. Code, § 1118, S1£pra) because the controversy existed prior to the formation of the association,
they stress the assertion that the latter was an excluded
company union. It was not, however, so far as the preliminary
injunction is concerned, and hence the case must be treated
as if there are two wholly independent labor organizations.
[ 4] We do not believe that the fact that a dispute existed
between defendants and plaintiff before the association was
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formed and came into the picture, takes the case out of the
act requiring that the interference with the employer's business arise out of a controversy between unions, for after the
association was formed and plaintiff's employees became members thereof, it endeavored to have defendants withdraw from
the arena and to induce plaintiff to bargain with it exclusively,
yet defendants continued their activities, interfering with
plaintiff's business. It may be inferred that what began as a
<lispute betwem1 employer and the union became a dispute
between unions as to which should be exclusive bargaining
agent. To place defendants' construction on the act would
make it practically never applicable, for the unions would have
to act simultaneously in their demands or disputes with the employer before there would be an interference with the employer's business arising out of a controversy between the unions
as to which should be exclusive bargaining agent. If one of
them made the demand any time before the other, then the interference would arise out of a dispute between the employer
and that union rather than between the unions. It would rest
wholly within the power of the unions to arrange the chronology of their demands, and escape the force of the act. \V e do
not believe such an interpretation of the act is reasonable.
'fhe orders are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, ,T., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
eoncurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The construction placed by the majority on the ,Jurisdictional Strike Act will prevent a union from continuing
to press its dispute with the employer over wages or working
conditions whenever the employer calls in another union
and makes the dispute jurisdictional. In my opinion it was
not the intention of the Legislature that the act be so construed.
The majority holds that the demand for recognition by
the association, which was not even in existence untilll months
after the strike began, converted the previously lawful picketing within the prohibitions of the ,Jurisdictional Strike Act.
The employer is allowed by the majority holding to enjoin
the picketing by the union that instituted the strike, and to
negotiate solely with the second union that subsequently appeared on the scene and created the interunion conflict. The
act cannot reasonably be interpreted to allow an injunction
in this situation.
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The Jurisdictional Strike Act is designed to protect employers caught between conflicting union demands. It applies
when the dispute is not one over traditional and lawful union
demands, such as wages and hours, but instead is over overlapping claims by rival unions to job opportunities. In the
latter situation the employer is placed in a position where
he will be subjected to picketing and economic coercion, no
matter how willing he may be to bargain in good faith with
either union. By outlawing aggressive union action in connection with controversies between several unions over the
exclusive right to perform work, California has followed a
general trend in state and national legislation.
California did not, however, go farther and give the employers more protection than the necessities of the problem
demanded. By the phrase ''arising out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations,'' the application of
the act is limited to cases where the forbidden concerted
activity results from interunion disputes. It does not apply
if the dispute is simply between an employer and a union.
In the present case, the picketing by the Bakery Workers
was peaceful and for a lawful purpose when it commenced on
December 7, 1948. At that time there was no basis for injunctive relief. Nearly a year later, the association appeared
on the scene and informed the employer that if he signed a
contract with the Bakery Workers, the association would
commence picketing. The majority opinion states that thereafter the picketing by the Bakery \Vorkers came within the
act. But can it be seriously contended that a continuous
course of picketing in support of a strike, existing for many
months before the appearance of the second union, arose out
of, resulted from, or was proximately caused by a controversy
between the two unions~ The employer concedes that the
picketing was lawful in its inception, but argues that he
''obtained a remedy'' when the second labor organization
presented a demand for recognition. The majority accepts
this argument and gives the employer injunctive relief, not
against the second union that interfered and subjected the
employer to the conflicting demands, but against the first
union, that had been picketing in support of a hitherto lawful
strike for the purposes of gaining recognition and reinstatement of a discharged union member. I have difficulty following the reasoning that the lawful acts of the Bakery Workers
were transformed into unlawful acts by the conduct of a
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hostile labor organization, with which it has no affiliation or
connection.
Other provisions of the Jurisdictional Strike Act and the
Labor Code would seem to reinforce the conclusion that the
words ''arising out of a controversy between two or more
labor organizations'' made the act inapplicable at the time
the injunction issued. Section 1119 provides that nothing
in the act ''shall be construed to interfere with collective
bargaining subject to the prohibitions herein set forth.'' This
provision is meaningless, if picketing may be prohibited whenever a second union makes a demand upon the employer during
the existence of a bona fide dispute between the employer and
the union engaged in the picketing. Absent more specific
provisions in the act, this section prevents the act from being
interpreted to ban concerted union action in ordinary strikes.
(See International Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S.
665, 673 [71 S. Ct. 961, 95 L.Ed. 1277].) Moreover, the public
policy of this state, as expressed in section 923 of the Labor
Code, is that individual workers shall be free to negotiate
the terms of their employment, and to be free from the
interference of their employers in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining. The decisions of this
court make it clear that a union may use concerted action to
g·ain objectives reasonably related to legitimate interests of organized labor. (McKay v. Retail Auto. S.L. Union, 16 Cal.2d
311 [106 P.2d 373], and companion cases.)
The majority supports its construction of the act on the
ground that otherwise it would be ''practically never applicable, for the unions would have to act simultaneously in their
demands or disputes with the employer before there would
be an interference with the employer's business arising out
of a controversy between the unions as to which should be
exclusive bargaining agent."
This objection would be obviated if the act applies to the
union that intervened in the pre-existing dispute between the
first union and the employer. The California statute is
significantly different from the Taft-Hartley Act, ~hich provides that when one union gains certification as the union
which the employees wish to represent them, other unions
cannot thereafter intervene and subject the employer to conflicting demands for work assignments. (Section 8 (b) ( 4) (D) ;
see International Longshoremen's & W. Union v. Juneau
Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 [72 S.Ct. 235, 96 L.Ed 275];
Petro, Union Job-Seeking Aggression, 50 Mich.L.Rev., 497,
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fll0-520.) The California statnte dors not contain certification proeedure, and there thtls is presented a serious problr.m
in determining in disputes between an employer and more
than one union whieh union is entitled to carry out coneerted aetivities so that employees may achieve the legitimate
objectives of organized labor, and whieh unions are prevented
from entering the picture and exposing an innocent employer to mutually exclusive demands by rival unions. The
majority resolves this difficulty by applying the statute to all
unions making claims for the right to represent the employees,
regardless of the prior history of disputes and contraets between the employer and the union first representing, or claiming to represent, the employees. :F'urther, as I read the majority opinion, there is no requirement that the unions in fact
represent any of the employees: all that is required is that
more than one union claim the right to represent them. The
majority vvould thus allow the employer either to contract
with the union that offers the best terms and obtain injunctive
relief against other unions making more unpalatable requests,
or, so long as two rival unions are present, to enjoin picketing
by both unions and gain perpetual freedom from concerted
labor action. To protect employers from demands by more
than one union, the majority gives the right to ban picketing
by all unions, even though one union may have represented
the employees for many years.
'l'he express languag·e of the act does not support the foregoing construction. As we have already seen, the words
''arising out of a controversy between two or more labor
organizations'' prevent the statute from being applied to the
union that originally began picketing for a lawful purpose.
Concededly, however, unless the statute is meaningless, the
employer must be entitled to some type of injunctive relief in
order to eliminate jurisdictional demands from the picketing
and confine the dispute to one over traditional lawful union
objectives. The employer will be fully protected and the
purposes of the act carried out by giving him relief against the
demand by the second union. An ordinary strike between
a single union and an employer does not ''arise out'' of a
dispute between two unions, and the act thus does not apply
to picketing arising out of renewal of a collective bargaining
agreement or out of an organizational strike when no other
nnion is simultaneously making a claim that it should represent
the employees. On the other hand, when an employer either
has a contract with one union, or is engaged in a strike with
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a union, and a second union intervenes and makes demands
for job rights that conflict with the demands of the first
union, the controversy between the second union and the
employer would appear to be one "arising out of" a jurisdici ional conflict between the two unions. The action of the
second union puts the employer in a position where he would
face economic pressure whether he acceded to the demands
of the first union, or rejected them and accepted those of the
second union. The first union, however, did nothing different
from what it had been doing before the second union appeared
and, as to the first union, the picketing would, therefore, still
''arise out of'' the original dispute with the employer. Since
the only reason there is any conflict between two unions over
job rights is the interference of the second union, it would
seem to follow that the employer is entitled to prevent the
second nnion from concerted interference with his business,
but that the first union is not within the prohibitions of the act.
The act as a whole is aimed at preventing a union from
interfering with another union which has a dispute with
the employer-to prevent the latter union from creating a
situation where the employer is faced with demands from
both unions for exclusive representation rights. It is, therefore, the latter union which should be enjoined from its
activities because it is in the wrong. This is recognized by
the act when it provides that "any person" injured or
thrratened with injury by a violation of the act may obtain
injunctive relief. (Lab. Code, § 1116.) "Person" includes
a labor organization. (Ibid.,§ 1117.) 'rhus the nnion engaged
in a dispute with the employrr should be entitled to have
the interfering union restrained from concerted activity on
thr gTound that snch activity merely creates an ilhmory
jurisdictional strike where none exists.
Thr orders should be reversed.
Traynor, J., concurred.
Appellants' pctitioll for a rehearing was denied April 2,
l9fi8. Carter, ,f., and 'l'raynor, .T., were of the opinion that the
petition shonld be granted.

